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The Internet: Place, Property, or

Thing-All or None of the Above?
October 29, 2003
Dinner Speech

Reading Too Much Into Nothing:
The Metaphor of Place and the
Internet

by David Hricik*

*
Assistant Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
Northwestern University Law School (J.D., curn laude 1988); University of Arizona (B.A.,
with High Honors, 1984).
This is the text of the dinner speech I gave at the Mercer Law Review annual
Symposium dinner. While I am sure I did not read this verbatim, the only additions I have
made are the footnotes, the headings, and the title. The title comes from "Too Much Into
Nothing" by John Wesley Harding, off the compact disc THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. ACE
(Mammoth 2000). I struggled with several themes for this speech, which was designed to
provide an introduction to the topics that would be discussed at the Symposium, but which
did not trespass too deeply into anyone's area. I highly recommend that anyone
investigating the role of metaphor on the Internet consider Italo Calvino's novel, IF ON A
WINTER'S NIGHT, A TRAVELER (Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich 1979), which was, for a time,
a substantial part of this speech.
I would like to thank Professor Linda Jellum for some superb improvements to an earlier
version of this speech.
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INTRODUCTION

When I was asked to speak at this dinner, I realized I was doing
something I had never done before. Normally, I am given the task of
speaking for ninety minutes early in the morning at Continuing Legal
Education (CLE) conferences for patent lawyers. The challenge is
always first, how to wake them up, especially when they are often tired
and may have had a heavy dinner and drinks the night before with
other attendees and, next, how do I keep them awake for ninety
minutes?
With this speech, I realized I now faced those same challenges, but at
night, after a heavy meal.
I am kidding. I am not speaking for ninety minutes-just about
twelve. But they are twelve packed minutes.
I am going to make only three basic points tonight. My first point is
this: Metaphor and analogy play a large role in disputes involving the
Internet, and there is nothing wrong with that. I will show you that
courts not only regularly rely on metaphors, but they are influenced by
metaphors and analogies as well. Metaphors matter. But there is
nothing wrong with analogy and metaphor in the law. Metaphor and
analogy are the way we explain that which is unfamiliar-by comparing
it to that which we know. Metaphor and analogy are the meat and
potatoes of legal reasoning.
My second point is this: Even though they matter, courts have
Courts
regularly recognized that metaphors are not controlling.
They
of
the
Internet.
the
realities
regularly look past the metaphors to
realities.
words
but
by
bound
by
know they are not
Third, I will get to my real point. My real point is that the danger the
Internet faces is not that the metaphors are imperfect, or that they are
given too much weight, but that the Internet is in many ways unlike
anything before. Yet rather than analyzing the underlying policies that
a rule of law would impose, courts too often treat the Internet as if it is
no different than that which has come before it-it is.
Let us get started.
II.

METAPHORS MATTER, BUT THERE IS

NOTHING WRONG WITH THAT

My first point is that metaphor and analogy matter, but there is
nothing wrong with that.
I ran a Westlaw search on a fairly narrow query of "analogy or
metaphor" in the same sentence with "Internet." That search brought
up 26 cases and 700 law review articles. I brought all 726 cases and
articles with me, and I would like to read every one of them to you.
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Kidding. The shear number of cases and articles retrieved in that
simple search shows that courts rely on metaphor.
I will read you only a couple. Here is the first case. Let me quote it
to you:
The Internet can be described by a number of different metaphors, all
fitting for different features and services that it provides. For example,
the Internet resembles a highway, consisting of many streets leading
to places where a user can find information. The metaphor of the
Internet as a shopping mall or supermarket, on the other hand, aptly
describes the Internet as a place where the user can shop for goods,
information, and services. Finally, the Internet also can be viewed as
a telephone system for computers by which data bases of information
can be downloaded to the user, as if all the information existed in the
user's computer's disc drive.1
Courts are clearly applying metaphor to legal disputes involving the
Internet. In fact, according to reports about oral arguments in a case
before the United States Supreme Court, the "U]ustices seemed bent on
finding the appropriate analogy which would tie the Internet to some
existing line of First Amendment jurisprudence: is the Internet more
like a television? a radio? a newspaper? a 900-line? a village green?"2
The law uses metaphor in dealing with the Internet, but there is
nothing pernicious about the use of metaphor and analogy in developing
the law of the Internet. Analogy and metaphor are how the common law
has, and likely always will, develop. We use these linguistic tools to
help us relate the familiar to the unfamiliar. But the law must choose
its metaphors wisely. Why? Because metaphor has power. Metaphor
matters.
Once a metaphorical link between something familiar and something
new is made, then rhetorically it is as if a burden-shifting occurs. If the
law says that the Internet is an information superhighway, then
someone who is arguing it is not has the burden to prove otherwise-to
prove that the analogy is inappropriate. We will see an example of that
burden-shifting effect in a moment when I talk about metatags and a
Ninth Circuit decision analogizing metatags to billboards.
The fact that the metaphor becomes the presumptively correct starting
point is why, I am sure, the Supreme Court Justices were so diligently

1. EDIAS Software Intl, L.L.C. v. BASIS Intl Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ariz.
1996) (footnotes omitted).
2. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Linda
Greenhouse, What Level of Protectionfor Internet Speech? High Court Weighs Decency-Act
Case, N.Y. TIVES, Mar. 24, 1997, at C5).
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searching for what each believed was the best metaphor. If metaphor
had no power, they would not have cared. Choice of metaphor matters.
I think the fact that the Supreme Court Justices were so focused on
the appropriate metaphor proves that fact, but let me give you just one
case that presents a clear example of how the metaphor chosen carries
real power.
This case addressed whether a state statute that made it a crime to
distribute obscene materials to minors, through a computer, violated the
The court was very clear that the metaphor
Commerce Clause.
mattered:
This case, too, depends on the appropriate analogy. I find, as described
more fully below, that the Internet is analogous to a highway or
railroad. This determination means that the phrase "information
superhighway" is more than a mere buzzword; it has legal significance,
because the similarity between the Internet and more traditional
instruments of interstate commerce leads to analysis under the
Commerce Clause.'
In a moment, we will see another example of the power of the metaphor,
but my first point is done. Metaphor and analogy are invoked by the
courts when addressing the Internet. That is how legal reasoning works.
There is nothing pernicious about metaphor, but we must recognize that
the acceptance of a particular metaphor has an impact on the law.
Metaphor matters.
III.

COURTS KNOw METAPHORS Do NOT CONTROL

My second point is that courts recognize that though they matter,
metaphors do not control. The courts typically recognize that the
metaphor or analogy, while it is a starting point and so carries with it
that power, is not controlling.
Just two cases.
The first example is from a case analyzing the role of metatags in
causing initial interest confusion in trademark cases. To some of you,
that is Greek, so let me give some background.
Suppose I put up a sign on Interstate 75 here in Macon that says,
"McDonald's Restaurant at Exit 5." In fact, the McDonald's is not until
the next exit, exit 6. When people pull off at exit 5, they will not find a
McDonald's, but they will see David Hricik's Burger Joint. As a result,
I may steer business from McDonald's to my burger joint. I will have

3. Id. (emphasis added).
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created initial interest confusion, and McDonald's might have a
trademark suit against me.4
What is a metatag? A metatag is text that is invisible to web users
but is seen by search engines like Google or Yahoo!.5 So, I could put
"McDonald's burgers" in metatext on my website. If people run a search
for "McDonald's burgers" through a search engine like Google or Yahoo!,
they may end up going to my site before they go to McDonald's.
Now that you understand what a metatag is and how it could create
initial interest confusion in a trademark case, I can talk about a case
that demonstrates the power, but lack of conclusiveness, of the
metaphor.
In 1999 the Ninth Circuit analogized metatags to billboards.6 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that using someone else's metatag on a website
to steer traffic to that site, instead of to the trademark owner's site,
could cause initial interest confusion just like a billboard could.7
A year later, a district court faced precisely the same issue. It used
the same metaphor but realized it was not perfect:
Use of the highway billboard metaphor is not the best analogy to a
metatag on the Internet. The harm caused by a misleading billboard
on the highway is difficult to correct. In contrast, on the information

superhighway, resuming one's search for the correct website is
relatively simple. With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay,

a viewer can return to the search engine's results and resume
searching for the original website.'

This is just one of the cases I found which shows that courts recognize
that the metaphor is not controlling. The factual realities underneath
the metaphor are what count.
A second example.
This is from a case analyzing whether a website should be treated like
a billboard for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction. Was the
website "in" the foreign state for purposes of determining personal
jurisdiction? Listen to how the court first relied upon analogy but then
looked to the realities behind it:

4. This example is based upon the example in Brookfield Communications,Inc. v. West
Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). That court analogized
metatags to billboards. Id.
5. Id. at 1061-62 n.23.
6. Id. at 1064.
7. Id.
8. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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An internet posting shares attributes of several traditional methods of
commerce. It is posted at a web address and to the extent it is not
interactive is analogous to magazine or interstate billboard advertising.
One difficulty with using this analogy to automaticallyconclude such
advertising is targeted at the forum's internet consumers, however, is
that the internet is worldwide and any company advertisingon it would
be subject to every law of virtually every jurisdictionin the world.9
My second point is over. There is no doubt that metaphor and analogy
are affecting judicial analysis and the understanding of the Internet.
Metaphors matter because they create a starting point for the courts.
But metaphors do not control. The realities control. That leads me to
my third and final point.
IV.

ALHOUGH COURTS LOOK PAST THE METAPHOR, THEY Do NOT
FULLY APPRECIATE THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE INTERNET

Although courts properly strip away the metaphor, they too often
apply existing common law rules without considering whether the
unique nature of the Internet warrants a different rule.
The reality of the Internet is that the Internet is different. It is
different from anything else for many reasons: It is instantaneous. It
is global. It allows for universal, synchronous access to the same
materials. Not everyone in the world can simultaneously read the same
book, but they can read the same web page. Not everyone in the world
can attend an auction, even at the Rose Bowl, but they can peruse eBay.
The Internet is unique.
Too often, however, courts are failing to fully appreciate its unique
nature. Instead they are treating it as if it were no different than that
which has come before it.
Let me put this in terms of one of the issues we will hear about
tomorrow, and then I will shut up. We are going to hear about how
courts are addressing trespass theories on the Internet. The issue is this:
Under most state laws, an injunction against trespass to land does not
require a showing of damage. You can have someone tossed out of your
house merely because he interferes with your right of possession. There
is strict liability for trespass to land.
But the same is not true for trespass to chattels. You must establish
harm to the chattel. So if a website is real property, trespass to it may
be enjoined without a showing of damages; if it is personal property,
there must be proof of damage.

9. Origins Natural Res., Inc. v. Kotler, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 (D. N.M. 2001)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Most courts are correctly recognizing that websites are not real
property. Websites are not land. They are code stored on servers.
Because websites are not real property, the courts conclude they are
chattels. Because they are chattels, there must be proof of damage to
get an injunction against trespass.
I submit that this approach is more misguided than the use of
metaphor. A website is not land, and arguing by metaphor that it is
land is fruitless.
But simply because in the past damages have been required in
trespass to chattel cases should not mean that the same rule should
apply to websites. Instead the questions must be: Are the same or
similar policies that are furthered by application of strict liability to
trespass to property furthered by application of that rule to websites?
Why or why not? What are the consequences to the Internet of requiring
proof of damage?
Only a few courts are addressing these issues. Yet only by stripping
away metaphor and looking to the unique real world nature of the
Internet can the law be crafted in a way that will further the growth
and breadth of this remarkable technological creation.
That is why the issues this Symposium will address are so critical. If
we get it wrong, if we rely on metaphors rather than reality, or if we
apply existing law without recognizing the unique nature of the Internet,
we can do harm.
Above all else we should do no harm.
Thank you.
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